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The Pope's Submarine

JOHN H. GARVEY*

This Article looks at the conflict between religious authority
and liberal politics from a point of view within the Catholic
Church. It examines the grounds of the teaching authority asserted by the Church, the scope and strength of that authority,

and the possibility that obedience to authority will create dilemmas for religiously committed public officials. For purposes of il-

lustration it uses New York Governor Mario Cuomo's religious
and political observations on the subject of abortion.
This Symposium was convened to discuss the place of religious
arguments about public policy in a liberal democracy. We typically
look at the problem through the lens of legal theory or political theory. I want to approach it from the opposite direction-to look at
how liberal politics might get in the way of a public official's religious obligations, and how the conscientious politician can deal with
this dilemma. Religious obligations differ across denominations, so I
will confine my observations to the Catholic politician. I focus on
Catholics for several reasons. I myself am one, so the issue has some
personal interest. And Catholics are the largest denomination in the
United States, so the question matters for a lot of people. The Catholic Church also asserts more authority over its members (a stricter
obligation on their part to obey) than most American sects do. In
* Ashland Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. I would like to thank Walter
Bado, Gerard V. Bradley, James T. Burtchaell, David Little, Thomas L. Shaffer, Richard G. Wilkins, and the Symposium participants for reading this Article with unusual
care and making a host of thoughtful suggestions, some of which I have been wise
enough to heed.

addition, the American Catholic bishops in recent years have exercised their teaching authority across a range of publicly salient issues-the economy, nuclear war, abortion, medical care, and so on.
These facts, taken together, multiply and intensify the occasions
when Catholic politicians are forced to reconcile their religious and
political loyalties. Sometimes the drama is compelling enough to
capture the attention of the newspapers.
Consider the case of Mario Cuomo. He is the Governor of New
York and a liberal Democrat. In September 1984, he gave an address at the University of Notre Dame entitled Religious Belief and
Public Morality: A Catholic Governor's Perspective." He began by
explaining that he accepted the Church's teaching about abortion as
the rule for his own life. 2 But as a public official he could not approve a legal prohibition of abortion. 3 Most of New York's citizens
were not Catholics, and many of them (indeed many Catholics) disagreed with what the Church said. An anti-abortion law would be
unfair to them, and ineffective in the way Prohibition was.4 Cuomo
added that he also favored Medicaid funding of abortions for the
poor. 5
A month later Archbishop (now Cardinal) John J. O'Connor of
New York said that, although he would not urge voters to choose
any particular candidate in the upcoming elections, the most important question they faced was the need to "protect the rights of the
unborn." 6 O'Connor may have had several politicians in mind. Geraldine Ferraro, another New York Catholic whose views mirrored
Cuomo's, was then running for Vice President. Two years later
O'Connor's Vicar General, Bishop Joseph T. O'Keefe, announced
that parishes within O'Connor's archdiocese should not provide a
platform to speakers "whose public position is contrary to [the]
teaching of the Church."'7 O'Keefe said the policy was not aimed at
1. Mario M. Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor's
Perspective, Address at the University of Notre Dame (Sept. 13, 1984), in 1 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 13 (1984).
2. Mr. Cuomo stated:
As a Catholic, I accept the Church's teaching authority. . . I accept the
Bishops' position that abortion is to be avoided.
As Catholics, my wife and I were enjoined never to use abortion to destroy
the life we created, and we never have. We thought Church doctrine was clear
on this, and, more than that, both of us felt it in full agreement with what our
hearts and our consciences told us.
Id. at 21.
3. Id. at 24.
4. Id. at 25.
5. Id. at 25-26.
6. Kenneth A. Briggs, Fight Abortion, O'Connor Urges Public Officials, N.Y.
TIMs, Oct. 16, 1984, at Al.
7. NAT HENTOFF, JOHN CARDINAL O'CONNOR: AT THE STORM CENTER OF A
CHANGING AMERICAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

139 (1988).
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Cuomo, though it would of course apply to him.8
The controversy has not subsided. In November 1989, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops passed a resolution declaring
that "no Catholic can responsibly take a 'pro-choice' stand when the
'choice' in question" involves abortion. 9 Three months later Bishop
Thomas V. Daily, the new head of the Brooklyn Diocese (where
Cuomo has lived most of his life), said he would not permit the governor to speak on abortion in any of his diocese's churches. 10 And in
June 1990, Cardinal O'Connor warned that Catholic politicians who
make public funds available for abortions "are at risk of
excommunication.""
I want to use this case as a context for thinking about three questions. First, why should Cuomo, as a Catholic, have to pay any heed
to the views of the bishops? What are the grounds of the religious
authority which the Catholic Church asserts over its members? Second, when and to what extent does Cuomo's religion oblige him to
heed his Church's teaching? What are the scope and strength of the
Catholic Church's teaching authority over its members? Third, if
Cuomo did heed his Church's teaching out of a sense of religious
obligation, would this be illegal, impolitic, or illiberal? Is this kind of
religious authority inconsistent with the letter or spirit of the American system of government?
I. THE GROUNDS OF RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY
There was a time when people relied upon their religious sense to
help them understand the idea of political authority. This is why
German kings for centuries claimed the title of Holy Roman Emperor. I think the tables are turned today. For most of us political
authority is a familiar - even congenial - notion, but it is hard to
see why we should take seriously a claim of religious authority.
Though the two ideas are not congruent there is some overlap, and a
brief review of the grounds of political authority is a good way to
approach the subject of Part I.
In what follows I will ask you to suppose that X is a citizen and Y
8. Id. at 138-54.
9. Peter Steinfels, CardinalAccepts Discord on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21,
1990, at A24.
10. Ari L. Goldman, New Brooklyn Bishop to Bar Cuomo Over Abortion, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 1990, at Al.
11. Ari L. Goldman, O'Connor Warns Politicians Risk Excommunication Over
Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1990, at Al.

is a political official, a political institution, or the government itself
(in a collective sense) in Xs society. When we say that Y has authority over X we mean, among other things, that X has an obligation to obey Y in certain matters. I pass over such details as the
scope of Y's jurisdiction and the strength of X's obligation (whether
it is certain or merely prima facie, absolute or defeasible), and so on.
Authority is thus a kind of jural contradictory of freedom: If Y has
authority over X then X lacks freedom to that extent. 12 Why would
X be willing to give up her freedom and submit to Y's political authority? Or more briefly, what are the grounds of political authority?
One obvious justification for political authority is that it is the
only sensible solution to coordination problems. For many political
issues it matters more that we resolve them than how we resolve
them. It is a matter of indifference to me whether I drive on the
right or the left side of the road; but I don't want any oncoming
traffic on my side. To take a more timely subject, given that I have
to pay income taxes, I don't really care whether I pay them on April
15 or July 1; but it is administratively simpler to have everyone pay
on the same day. All that we need in these cases is a convention.
There are a number of possibilities to which we would agree. The
problem is how to signal everyone so that we can act harmoniously
and not collide, like Alphonse and Gaston going through a doorway.
The obvious solution is to let Y specify the convention and require
everyone to observe it.1
We can justify the use of authority to solve prisoners' dilemmas on
similar grounds. Here the choice among outcomes is not a matter of
indifference, but citizens will opt for a mutually harmful outcome
unless they are assured that others will cooperate. The provision of
public goods (street lights; the army) is an example. If no one enforced the tax laws, the wise course for each X would be to cheat: if
others paid, X would get free lighting and defense; if others did not
pay, X would be foolish to do so. And if each X reasoned that way,
we would have no public goods. The solution that is mutually most
satisfactory can only be reached if each X grants Y enough authority
12. There are those who dispute the idea that authority entails a duty to obey. See
Rolf Sartorius, PoliticalAuthority and Political Obligation, 67 VA. L REV. 3 (1981);
Robert Landeson, In Defense of a Hobbesian Conception of Law, 9 PHIL. & PUa. AFF
139 (1980). I am persuaded otherwise for the reasons detailed in JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY oF FREEDOM 23-37 (1986).
On the notion of jural contradictories, see R.W.M. DIAS, JURISPRUDENCE 33-65 (3d ed.
1976).
13. See the discussion in RAz, supra note 12, at 30, 49. A broader though related
argument is made in YvEs SIMON, NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF AUTHORITY (1940). Simon contends that authority would be necessary even in a community of intelligent
adults acting.with perfect good will. Its essential function would be "to assure the unity
of action of a united multitude." Id. at 17. But he has in mind, apart from coordination
problems, cases of persistent disagreement in matters of practical reason.
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to prevent cheating.
Not all political issues, however, are simple problems of coordination. That is a justification for political authority that reaches only
some of the things governments do. A second kind of argument holds
that authority is justified when it rests on consent. This is a familiar
theory to students of American government. The Declaration of Independence asserts that governments derive "their just powers from
the consent of the governed." In the Constitution the people "vest"
power in the three branches of government. Statutory law (made by
elected officials) is superior to common law (made by judges) because the former are better attuned to the voice of the people.
Consent is also the organizing principle of social contract theory.
Locke argues in The Second Treatise that no one can be "subjected
to the political power of another without his own consent."1 5 Now
there are various ways of explaining why consent should be significant, but one very influential one is this: The primary axiom of
moral theory (many people say) is that I should pursue my own good
in my own way. Political authority appears to be inconsistent with
this axiom, because it deprives me of the freedom to act as I wish.
But if I authorize the authority to act for me - if I make it my
agent - its acts are my own. So there is no loss of autonomy when I
consent to authority.
Why, though, would I want an authority to act for me? One
strand of social contract theory says I do so for instrumental reasons
- I undertake obligations in return for other benefits which, on the
whole, outweigh the burden of submission. When I hire a lawyer, I
authorize the lawyer to bind me in negotiations, at trial, and so on.
This has a cost, but it also amplifies my own power to act. So too
with the government. Submission to political authority has a cost
but, say Hobbes and Locke, it is the only sure way to preserve my
life, liberty, and estate. It might also afford benefits (like culture)
that are not possible outside political society.
The other strand of social contract theory, found in Rousseau,
takes a noninstrumental view of consent. It holds that there is moral
value in shaping my own world - the projects I undertake and the
relationships I enter into. Just as the relationship between husband

14. See the discussion in EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS
18-73 (1977).
15. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 95 (Thomas P.
Peardon ed., 1952). See also THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 112 (Michael Oakeshott ed.,
1962).

and wife has intrinsic value, so it might be with the relation between
citizen and 16
society. Consent is a constituent element in these
relationships.
Like the need for coordinated action, consent is not a completely
satisfactory foundation for political authority. There are two obvious
problems with relying too heavily on it. One is that, except for naturalized citizens, people do not actually consent to the government's
authority. The other is that the government's authority is so extensive that even if people did consent, it is hard to see how their consent could be informed and intelligent.
Joseph Raz has recently proposed a third ground for political authority. He suggests that Y's authority depends on a showing that X
"is likely better to comply with reasons which apply to him (other
than the alleged authoritative directives) if he accepts the directives
• . . as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than
by trying to follow the reasons which apply to him directly.117 Consider this illustration. I have investment objectives which I communicate to my broker: do not do anything risky; aim for long-term
growth, not short-term profits; diversify; etc. These are what Raz
would call "reasons which apply to X." Until recently I made my
own investments and earned an average of five percent annually.
Now I let my broker choose for me, and I earn ten percent. I satisfy
my own investment objectives better by giving him authority over
my account.
I need to clear up a point about the nature of this authority. Suppose that in 19911 tried a mixed approach. I considered my broker's
advice as an independent and weighty reason bearing on each investment decision. But I also factored in my own hunches and tips and
made my own judgments, because sometimes my broker has been
wrong and I wanted to correct for those cases. In 1991 I made seven
percent. When I say that he now has authority over my account, I
mean that he has preemptive authority - I let him decide even in
cases where I think he is wrong.18
Raz calls this the "service conception" of authority, because the
"role and primary normal function [of authorities] is to serve the
governed." 19 We often see the service conception at work in administrative law. The Environmental Protection Agency and the courts
have the same reasons for wishing to stamp out air pollution - the
reasons that moved Congress to pass the Clean Air Act. But in litigation under the Act courts can best comply with these higher-order
16. Joseph Raz, Government by Consent, in AUTHORITY REVISITED: XXIX Nomos
76 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1987); RAZ, supra note 12, at 80-94.
17. RAz, supra note 12, at 53 (emphasis omitted).
18. Id. at 57-62.
19. Id. at 56.
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reasons by following the EPA's rules, because this is a complicated
matter, the EPA knows a lot about science and industry, it has investigated the problem in depth, and it has to make a pattern of
interlocking practical judgments. A court should not ignore the
EPA's rules just because it thinks they are wrong. Nor should it
treat the EPA's opinion as a kind of expert testimony, to be added in
the mix of reasons for and against a particular policy. The EPA has
authority, binding on the courts, to decide questions like these.20 But
the basis for its authority is that it can best serve the people.
The service conception of authority is not an argument that works
at wholesale. It is more or less convincing for different Ys, different
Xs, and different subject matters. Some agencies (the SEC, the
NLRB) get considerable deference from the courts; others get less.
Some rules ("Stay out of the deep water") provide different levels of
service to different Xs (this example may actually disserve the interests of good swimmers). And Y's pronouncements on different subject matters may vary in authoritativeness. (Compare the respect the
Supreme Court gives to Congress' decisions on free speech and on
federalism.)
Let me turn now to the question of religious authority, and particularly the authority of the Catholic Church. Why should individual
Catholics heed the instructions of their Church in cases where, left
to their own devices, they would do otherwise? The first justification
I offered for political authority was that it solved coordination
problems. The Catholic Church being a large institution, coordination problems naturally arise within it too, and its authority is a convenient solution. There are no specific religious reasons for
celebrating the feast of the Assumption on August fifteenth. But because there are reasons for celebrating the feast some time, and celebration is a community enterprise, it suits everyone to let the Church
pick a date.
If we recognize religious authority for reasons like these, however,
we run little risk of conflict between church and state. In coordination cases people are only interested in having an issue resolved; they
do not care how. This means that the Church will have a range of
acceptable solutions, and it can accommodate the state's demands
without compromising any religious belief. If the Assumption were
20. Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Chevron also relies heavily on the idea of consent. The EPA derives its authority in part,
the Court argues, from the elected branches. Congress has delegated power to it, and the
President influences its policy determinations.

celebrated on April fifteenth and this caused many Catholics to miss
filing their income tax returns, there would be no reason not to move
the feast to another date. (For that matter, the state could change
the income tax filing date. This is what it has done in laying out the
work week: people generally have Saturday and Sunday off.)
For this reason I will pass over the coordinating function as a basis
for the authority of the Catholic Church. There is a second argument that looks very much like this one, but that is in fact quite
different. The best way to understand it is by contrast with the notion of consent. In arguments about political authority, consent lets
me squar6 the government's commands with the assumption that I
must be allowed to pursue my own good in my own way. This
scheme is fundamentally individualist: what makes the government
legitimate is that I adopt it as my agent. It serves my purposes by
protecting my liberty and property. Or maybe it is one of my purposes-a relationship which I enter into because it has (for me) intrinsic value. The second argument for the Catholic view of church
authority begins with a different assumption. It is a mistake to suppose that an individual can carry on a religious enterprise by herself.
The smallest religiously significant unit is the Church. Consider the
metaphors Catholics use for the Church: the family (we are all
brothers and sisters of Christ, and God is our father), a flock of
sheep (the Church is a flock, and Jesus is the Good Shepherd), the
body (the Church's many members are parts of one body, and Jesus
is the Head). This way of thinking carries over to Catholic methods
of worship. The chief liturgical activity is the mass, a celebration in
the form of a meal (communion) that all members of a local church
are supposed to attend.21
That Catholics (indeed, most Christians) think this way is obvious.
The reasons are slightly more complex. One part of the explanation
is that the communal way of thinking grows naturally out of the Old
Testament. The Jews thought of themselves as God's chosen people
who were collectively promised salvation. Christians imagine that
God has made good on that promise but extended it to a larger
group. The Dogmatic Constitution on the Church approved by Vatican II states, "It has pleased God

. .

. to make men holy and save

them not merely as individuals without any mutual bonds, but by
making them into a single people ...
22 So the group matters because God's plan of salvation is communal.
21. Dogmatic Constitution on the Church (Lumen Gentium), in THE DOCUMENTS
Of VATICAN II §§ 1-8 (Walter M. Abbott ed. & Joseph Gallagher trans. ed., 1966)

[hereinafter Lumen Gentium]. In discussing various documents promulgated by the Seeond Vatican Council, I refer to the section numbers used in the documents rather than to
the page numbers in Abbott's compilation.
22. Id. § 9. Cf. Jeremiah 31:31-34 ("I will be their God, and they shall be my
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The group also matters because Catholics see in the Church a preview of the kingdom of God. The relations of members with each
other and with God have intrinsic value. I do not want to say that
this union makes people happy-that suggests that we value it for
the individual emotions it produces. A more accurate way of putting
it is that being connected in this way just is good, the way the love of
husband and wife just is good (even though it does not always make
us happy).
A third reason for the Church's communal aspect is that the
Church is a kind of sacrament: "a sign and an instrument" of "intimate union with God, and of the unity of all mankind." 23 Part of its
job is to show the world by example how to love one another and live
together in peace. This has to be a collective undertaking.
Suppose that I accept this way of looking at the Church and my
role in it. In this scheme, authority does not rest on my consent.
Contract theorists use consent to harmonize political authority with
the axiom that I should pursue my own good in my own way. But
the Church's communal value comes ahead of its value to me; we
start with a different axiom. One reason to support religious authority could be that it promotes unity in the Church.
This is not the same as the idea that authority helps us solve coordination problems. It is more like the notion of "family unity" that
relatives sometimes appeal to in times of bitterness and division. A
law that says "drive on the right" is a sensible signal that helps us
all accomplish what we want. Family unity is an independent value
that we invoke as a reason for tolerating unfair distributions and unjust treatment.
Catholics argue for papal primacy chiefly on the ground that it
promotes unity. It "serves to promote or preserve the oneness of the
church by symbolizing unity, and by facilitating communication,
mutual assistance or correction, and collaboration in the church's
mission. ' On a smaller scale "[t]he individual bishop . . . is the
visible principle and foundation of unity in his particular church." 25
Primacy is different from infallibility. There is a point to pursuing
Church unity and recognizing episcopal leadership even if it is sometimes wrong.
people.").

23. Lumen Gentium, supra note 21, § 1.

24. PAPAL PRIMACY AND THE UNIVERSAL CHURCH, LUTHERANS AND CATHOLICS
IN DIALOGUE V, at 12 n.4 (Paul Empie & T. Austin Murphy eds., 1974).

25. Lumen Gentium, supra note 21, § 23.

Let me turn now to a third justification for religious authority in
the Catholic Church. This one has some points in common with
Raz's service conception of authority. Raz argued that we could justify Y's authority by showing that X "is likely better to comply with
reasons which apply to him" if he follows Y's directives than if he
tries to follow the reasons themselves. Is there some reason to think
that religious authority renders such a service?
Catholics claim that there is, though in part for reasons that we
would not admit in the political realm. They believe that local bishops, and the college of bishops under the leadership of the pope (the
bishop of Rome), are guided by God himself in their teaching on
matters of faith and morals. This does not mean that they will not
make mistakes, though errors should not be frequent. And under
certain circumstances the pope himself, or in company with the bishops, can make infallible declarations. These "definitions, of themselves, and not from the consent of the Church, are justly styled
irreformable, for they are pronounced with the assistance of the
Holy Spirit.

'26

I do not want to overstate these beliefs, as often hap-

pens both in and outside the Church. Catholics do not claim: (1)
that popes and bishops can give correct direction effortlessly whenever they speak; nor (2) that they can do so over the objections of
the Church's members; nor even (3) that the magisterium (which
means, in the narrow sense, the teaching authority grounded in episcopal office) is the only source of teaching authority within the
Church. As to (1), Vatican II emphasized that the pope "and the
bishops, in view of their office and of the importance of the matter,
strive painstakingly and by appropriate means to inquire properly
into

. . .

revelation and to give apt expression to its contents" before

offering any direction. As to (2), though the consent of Church
members is not required to ratify a decree (as the Senate must ratify
a treaty), still the Church emphasizes that in the case of infallible
teachings "the assent of the Church can never be wanting, on account of the activity of that same Holy Spirit, whereby the whole
flock of Christ is preserved and progresses in unity of faith."2 8 To
turn it around, strong dissent is a sign that a teaching has not been
infallible. As to (3), though there is no denying the hierarchical
structure of the Catholic Church, it is a mistake to suppose that all
teaching authority operates from the top down. The Church's bishops are not by training or occupation its best informed members on
questions of politics, science, social science, or even theology. The
laity are expected to make practical, prophetic, and scholarly
26. Lumen Gentium, supra note 21, § 25; Carlo Cardinal Colombo, Obedience to
the Ordinary Magisterium, in OBEDIENCE AND THE CHURCH 75, 78-82 (1968).
27. Lumen Gentium, supra note 21, § 25.
28. Id.
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contributions."
These are issues I will return to in the next section. Having stated
them here, I want to stress that they qualify, but do not negate, my
main point, which is about the basis for the Church's teaching authority. Catholics justify that authority in part by a kind of service
conception. Just as I can advance my investment objectives by heeding the advice of my broker, so can I advance the cause of my salvation by heeding the Church's advice on matters within its
jurisdiction. The helpfulness of the Church's advice has a different
warrant, but if I accept it the cases are not all that different.
II. THE SCOPE OF RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY
In discussing Raz's service conception of authority, I noted that it
is a retail, not a wholesale, argument. Its effectiveness varies with
the identities of authority and subject, the nature of the issue, and so
forth. In this section I want to develop that observation and apply it
to religious authority. My ultimate concern is to explain the kind of
deference Governor Cuomo (as a practicing Catholic) should give to
the Church's teaching. But it turns out that we cannot state that
explanation in a simple formula. In Part II, section A, I will examine
the claims of authority that the Catholic Church makes over all its
members in their daily lives. In Part II, section B, I will look at the
special case of public officials.
A.

Ordinary Catholics

The authoritativeness of the Church's teaching for ordinary
Catholics depends in part on who the teacher is. Vatican II states
that the highest authority resides in the college of bishops with the
pope at their head. In the modern Church this is a lot of bishops,
and they do not often get together. When they do (in an ecumenical
council like Vatican II), they exercise their authority in a particularly "solemn way." 0 Even when not gathered together the bishops
can sometimes teach with the same authority, provided "they concur1
in a single viewpoint as the one which must be held conclusively.
The pope can also act alone with an authority equivalent to that of
29. Lumen Gentium, supra note 21, §§ 30-38; Pastoral Constitution on the
Church in the Modern World (Gaudium et Spes), in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II, at
199 (Walter M. Abbott ed. & Joseph Gallagher trans. ed., 1966) [hereinafter Gaudium
et Spes]; AVERY DULLES. THE SURVIVAL OF DOGMA 97-98 (1971).
30. Lumen Gentium, supra note 21, § 22.

31. Id. § 25.

an ecumenical council. He'is, Vatican II observes, "the supreme

teacher of the universal Church." 32 Each of these actors (ecumenical

council, the dispersed college of bishops, the pope) is thought to be

capable of acting infallibly, though they seldom do so, and such action depends on other factors.

These are not the only Church officials capable of acting authoritatively. Individual bishops have jurisdiction over Church members
within their territory. Their pronouncements are obligatory (though
not infallible) in a sense which I will explore below. 33 Groups of
bishops may also gather together on a national or territorial basis to
form episcopal conferences, a practice encouraged by Vatican II.
The National Conference of Catholic Bishops is a fairly active example. These groups, like their members, can act authoritatively but
not infallibly. 34 Then there is a whole host of congregations, commissions, offices, and so on that make up the Vatican bureaucracy, and
that function in ways not unlike the modern administrative state.
I need not detail the positions of all the various actors within the
Church hierarchy to make my first point, which is simply that the
authoritativeness of Church teaching varies with (among other
things) the identity of the speaker. It also varies with the speaker's
intention. The pope teaches infallibly only when "he proclaims by a
definitive act some doctrine of faith or morals." 3 5 The bishops do so
only when "they concur in a single viewpoint as the one which must
be held conclusively."36 The principle is like the clear statement rule
that we sometimes use in interpreting statutes: Y is understood to
have acted with infallible authority only when it has made perfectly
clear its intention to do so. 3 7 And the significance of intentions is not
32. Id. It is a little puzzling to see plenary authority lodged thus in two institutions. It is as though lawmaking authority were given to parliament (with the prime
minister at its head), and also to the prime minister acting alone. The best explanation
for the arrangement is this. The standard method for making really important pronouncements is an ecumenical council. Sometimes popes will act on their own, as Pius IX
did in 1854 (in proclaiming the dogma of the Immaculate Conception) and Pius XII did
in 1950 (in proclaiming the dogma of the Assumption). When they do so they are exercising the authority of the college of bishops. The pope does not need authorization or
consent to act in this manner. But it is practically impossible for him to act without
extensive consultation. See Karl Rahner, On the Relationship between the Pope and the
College of Bishops, 10 THEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS 50-70 (1973); FRANCIS A. SULLIVAN, MAGISTERIUM: TEACHING AUTHORITY IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 100-06 (1983).
33. Lumen Gentium, supra note 21, §§ 23, 25.
34. 1983 CODE c.753; Decree on the Bishops' Pastoral Office in the Church
(ChristusDominus), in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II §§ 36-38 (Walter M. Abbott
ed. & Joseph Gallagher trans. ed., 1966); Jan Schotte, A Vatican Synthesis, 12 ORIGINS
691, 692 (1983); James Hickey, The Bishop as Teacher, 12 ORIGINS 142, 142 (1982).
35. Lumen Gentium, supra note 21, § 25 (emphasis added).
36. Id. (emphasis added); 1 COMMENTARY ON THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II, at
210 (Herbert Vorgrimler ed., 1967).
37. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
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confined to the question of infallibility. None of the many documents
produced by Vatican II was meant to be definitive in that way. But
they bear various titles intended to indicate the degree of authoritativeness attached to each: "dogmatic constitution," "pastoral constitution," "constitution," "decree," "declaration."
The authoritativeness of Church teaching thus varies wiih the
speaker's office and intentions. It also varies with the subject matter.
The idea is a familiar one to lawyers. The United States Supreme
Court is often said to have ultimate authority to interpret the federal
constitution, but it has no such authority with regard to state law.
We sometimes express this by talking about the scope of its jurisdiction. So it is with the Church, whose jurisdiction is limited to matters of "faith or morals."3

Though it has sometimes pretended

otherwise, for example, it has no brief explaining to us the proper
form (monarchical, democratic) that civil government ought to take.
Even within the domain of faith and morals there is a great variety of issues, and the Church speaks with more authority on some of
them than on others. There are, in the first place, those things said to
be revealed in the gospel message (for example, that Jesus is God).
Theologians say that these are the primary object of the Church's
magisterium, things about which it can speak with most authority-at times infallibly. Then there is a range of other matters, more
or less closely related to these, to which the Church can speak with
diminishing degrees of authority (recognition of a Church council as
ecumenical; canonization of saints; etc.). 9I do not want to dwell on
these details, but only mention them to indicate how highly refined
and variable is the notion of authority, and because they bear on my
main interest, which is the deference due from observant Catholics
to the Church's instructions on moral questions-abortion in particular. That is a subject on which various authorities within the Church
have taught with a fairly consistent voice for a long time. The Second Vatican Council condemned the practice in the PastoralConstitution on the Church in the Modern World.40 Pope Paul VI repeated
this condemnation in his encyclical Humanae Vitae.41 The National
Conference of Catholic Bishops has done the same on numerous oc-

38.
39.
40.
41.

Lumen Gentium, supra note 21, § 25.
SULLIVAN, supra note 32, at 129-36.
Gaudium et Spes, supra note 29, §§ 51, 27.
POPE PAUL VI. HUMANAE VITAE § 14 (July 29, 1968).

casions.42 So has the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith.4
Cardinal O'Connor and the bishop of Brooklyn have echoed these
positions." What obligations do these teachings impose on Mr.
Cuomo?
As a matter of Church law, Cuomo's obligations depend in part on
whether the teachings of the pope and the council are supposed to be
infallible, and that is an uncertain point. Neither the Pastoral Constitution nor the encyclical displays the kind of clear intention that
accompanies infallible pronouncements. It may nonetheless be that
papal and episcopal opinion on the subject merits that status because
it has been so unanimous and so longstanding. 5 I will assume that it
does not, for the sake of making a point that can be applied more
widely. Here is what Vatican II said about the appropriate response
to noninfallible moral teachings:
Bishops, teaching in communion with the Roman Pontiff, are to be
respected by all as witnesses to divine and Catholic truth. In matters of
faith and morals, the bishops speak in the name of Christ and the faithful

are to accept their teaching and adhere to it with a religiousassent of soul.

This religious submission of will and of mind must be shown in a special
way to the authentic teaching6 authority of the Roman Pontiff, even when he

is not speaking ex cathedra.4

I understand the two italicized phrases to be essentially
equivalent, and for simplicity's sake I will focus on the phrase "religious submission of will and of mind." This claims two kinds of authority. One is practical, over how X acts ("submission of will"). The
other is epistemic, over how X thinks (submission "of mind"). Political authority, by contrast, is strictly practical. It requires obedience
but not agreement. Indeed, the First Amendment protects our freedom to disagree with the law. But the Church, because it is concerned with the formation of consciences, pays as much attention to
mental states as it does to behavior.
42. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, DOCUMENTATION ON THE
RIGHT TO LIFE AND ABORTION (1974); QUEST FOR JUSTICE: A COMPENDIUM OF STATEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES BISHOPS ON THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ORDER 1966-

1980 (J. Brian Benestad & Francis J. Butler eds., 1982).
43. Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declarationon Procured
Abortion, in VATICAN COUNCIL II: MORE POSTCONCILIAR DOCUMENTS 441 (Austin
Flannery ed., 1982).
44. HENTOFF, supra note 7, at 113, 250-51, 256-57, 259-60; Goldman, supra note
10. See also JAMES T. BURTCHAELL, THE GIVING AND TAKING OF LIFE 51-68 (1989).
45. Lumen Gentium, supra note 21, § 25. See James L. Heft, Dissent in the
Church, DIMENSIONS, Nov. 1986, at 2, 3; William E. May, Catholic Moral Teaching and
the Limits of Dissent, in VATICAN AUTHORITY AND AMERICAN CATHOLIC DISSENT 87,
91-94 (William E. May ed., 1987). There are, of course, those who say otherwise. See,
e.g., CHARLES E. CURRAN, TOWARD AN AMERICAN CATHOLIC MORAL THEOLOGY 46

(1987).
46. Lumen Gentium, supra note 21, § 25 (emphasis added). Canon 752 of the
Code of Canon Law uses almost the same language. See 1983 CODE c.752.
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There is a scene in Peter Pan where Peter is instructing the Darling children how to fly. The secret is to think lovely thoughts, but
that is something he cannot get them to do. Like Peter, the Church
cannot always get me to think lovely thoughts. Even when I am willing I may not be able. Suppose that I am a pregnant woman considering whether to have an abortion. I can conform my behavior
(submission of will) to Church teaching by just refusing to abort.
But how can I get myself to think that abortion.is wrong (submission
of mind) if, notwithstanding what the Church tells me, my mind will
not go along with that proposition? Learning about morals is like
learning geometry. I do not learn geometry by committing propositions to memory. Unless I work out the proofs, I cannot apply them
and will not remember them - in a word, I do not understand them.
So it is with the proposition that abortion is wrong. This will fit with
some of my convictions (how I feel toward the life growing inside
me; how I think I should behave toward my father who is on a respirator) and not with others (what I think about incest, rape, and
pregnant teenagers), and I cannot affirm or deny it until I have
worked it through.47
What then does submission of mind mean for this process? It
means, in the first place, that I should recheck my proof if I get a
different answer than the Church did. The Church's teaching counts
for something if it gives me reason to think that my own convictions
may be wrong. Submission of mind might also mean that I should
try reasoning backward through my proof, beginning with the authoritative answer. This sometimes works in mathematics, where
knowing the answer helps me to figure out the other steps in the
problem. And if none of this gets me to the orthodox conclusion, I
think I should remain willing to hear new arguments and new evidence, i.e. make my judgment interlocutory rather than final. 48 Finally, there will be cases where after long reflection I find the
balance of moral reasons uncertain. (Suppose I simply cannot decide
whether I think that human life begins at conception.) Here the
Church's teaching could change the outcome of my thinking because
it is an additional piece of evidence - a kind of morally expert testimony that changes the balance of proof.
47. See Elizabeth Anscombe, Authority in Morals, in PROBLEMS OF AUTHORITY
179 (John M. Todd ed., 1962).
48. SULLIVAN, supra note 32, at 153-73; Joseph A. Komonchak, OrdinaryPapal
Magisterium and Religious Assent, in READINGS IN MORAL THEOLOGY No. 3: THE
MAGISTERIUM AND MORALITY 67 (Charles E. Curran & Richard A. McCormick eds.,

1982).

These observations explain an important difference between epistemic and practical authority. In discussing Raz's service conception, I
noted how we give some authorities preemptive effect. My broker
has this kind of authority over my account. I do not weigh his advice
along with other reasons and sometimes reject it. I follow his direction even when I think it is wrong. Consider another example. A
court decision rests on reasons (stated in an opinion); but once the
decision becomes final it is itself a reason for X to act as directed. X
cannot impeach the decision by showing that the reasons supporting
it are weak; that is what it means for a matter to be res judicata.
The decision preempts the reasons that led to it.
Epistemic authority, unlike practical authority, cannot have this
preemptive effect. It can influence, and in uncertain cases determine,
the direction of my thought. But if I think it is wrong, it ipso facto
fails.
I now want to say a few words about the submission of will. Suppose I am pregnant and cannot bring myself to think - though I
have tried-that abortion would be wrong in my case. (I am in frail
health.) Must I nonetheless carry my pregnancy to term? In a word,
yes. The Church's practical authority is preemptive, like a conscription law whose morality I might dispute. An observant Catholic can
and should comply with it notwithstanding her disagreement.
But is this not asking me to behave irrationally, and maybe at
times immorally? (Think again about conscription laws.) In general
I think not. One kind of justification for it is the service conception
of the Church's authority. This case is formally like the preemptive
authority of my broker: I know that I will get a better return by
following his advice than I will by making my own decisions in cases
where I think he is wrong. This is true even though he sometimes is
wrong, because his error rate is lower than mine. Of course I have
different reasons for confidence in the two cases, but that cuts in the
Church's favor. I think that it has a low error rate because I believe
that Jesus is God, and that Jesus remains with the Church in various
ways (in its sacraments, its scripture, its tradition, etc.) - in a word,
for reasons that are fairly fundamental.
The second kind of justification has nothing to do with whether
the Church is right or wrong in its teaching in this case. It is that in
at least some cases orthopraxis, like orthodoxy, is a way of expressing the principle of unity that has an independent religious value in
the life of the Church. We see parallel examples in the affairs of
unions (solidarity), political parties (party loyalty), families ("blood
is thicker than water"), armies ("ours is not to reason why"), and
nations ("my country right or wrong"). In many of these cases the
principle is not a strong one. Indeed, the standard example is a caricature of the individual who gives this principle too much weight
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when it collides with another moral imperative. But the weight it
deserves varies from one case to another depending on the justification for collective action, and Church unity may be more important
than some other kinds.
I do not want to overstate this point. I have been picturing a case
where X thinks that abortion is not immoral and favors that course
because it would promote her own medical health. But imagine another case (make it compelling) where X has given her most conscientious attention to the Church's epistemic authority, and yet
concludes that the course prescribed by the Church would be actually immoral. Under these circumstances it is hard to justify giving
the Church's practical authority preemptive effect. The service conception holds that X can reduce her error rate by obedience in all
cases. But it cannot justify immoral action as a means to that end.
Nor should we urge immoral action as a way of achieving Church
unity. In this case I think that X is morally obliged to deviate from
the Church's teaching, even though the Church might impose sanctions on her for doing so.49
B.

Public Officials

All this talk so far, you might say, is beside the point, because
Governor Cuomo concedes his obligation to conform (in mind and
will) to the Church's teaching in his own life. He quarrels only with
the Cardinal's assertion that he should make that teaching the law of
the state of New York. What state officials must do in their official
capacity, he contends, is a matter that is beyond the Church's
jurisdiction.
Not quite. The Church acknowledges (though it has not always)
that "Christ [gave it] no proper mission in the political, economic, or
social order."' 50 But this does not mean everything that strict separationists might hope. The Church also rejects "the outmoded notion
that 'religion is a purely private affair' or that 'the Church belongs
in the sacristy.' Religion is relevant to the life and action of society." 5' In particular it maintains that it "has the right to pass moral
judgments, even on matters touching the political order, whenever
49. Cf 18 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA: PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY 5965 (Thomas Gilby, trans., Black Friars 1966) (Question 19, Article 5).
50. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 29, § 42; see also Declaration on Religious
Freedom (DignitatisHumanae) in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II, at 675 (Walter M.
Abbott ed. & Joseph Gallagher trans. ed., 1966) [hereinafter DignitatisHumanae].
51. DignitatisHumanae, supra note 50, § 4 n.11.

'basic personal rights or the salvation of souls make such judgments
necessary." 52 This of course entails that it should speak out on the
issue of abortion, which it sees as involving both "personal rights"
(of the fetus) and "salvation" (of those who procure and perform
abortions). But there are several reasons why its teachings in this
forum might be less authoritative than the model I have discussed
above.
To begin with, of course, most citizens of the state are not members of the Church. Over them the Church has no authority at all,
only such influence as the force of its arguments deserves. Cuomo is
not exempt on that account, but it is a fact that bears on his obligations in a second way. It is no less true for Catholics than it is for
others that duty is limited by possibility. Compromise is an unpleasant but necessary feature of political life. If the Governor finds it
impossible to secure enactment of the Church's agenda, he can
hardly be condemned for doing only what he can.
The need to compromise with nonmembers is not the only limit
facing the observant Catholic politician. It is not self-evident that the
full resources of the state should be used to enforce moral norms
even in cases where a majority of the voters would stand for it. No
one argues that Cuomo should work for passage of lawrs to enforce
the moral norms (binding within the Church) against contraception
and divorce. Consider the observation of Thomas Aquinas regarding
the limits of law:
Laws when they are passed should take account of the condition of the
men who will be subject to them; for, as Isidore says: the law should be
'possible both with regard to nature and with regard to the custom of the
country.' But capacity to act derives from habit, or interior disposition: not
everything that is possible to a virtuous man is equally possible to one who
lacks the habit of virtue ....
Now human law is enacted on behalf of the mass of men, the majority of
whom are far from perfect in virtue. For this reason human law does not
prohibit every vice from which virtuous men abstain; but only the graver
vices from which the majority can abstain; and particularly those vices
which are damaging of others, and which, if they were not prohibited,
would make it impossible for human society to endure:
as murder, theft,
and suchlike, which are prohibited by human law.' 3

The principal point here is that the moral law is a command of
perfection that would land us all in jail were the state to enforce it to
the letter. That would have disastrous implications for the Corrections budget. And it might mean that none of us would show up for
work on Monday. There is also a subsidiary point which Aquinas
overlooks, but which we who are more familiar with federal forms of
52.
53.

Gaudium et Spes, supra note 29, § 76.
Theologica: The Powers of Human Law, in AQUI133, 133-35 (A. P. D'Entreves ed. & J. G. Dawson

THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa
NAS: SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS

trans., 7th ed. 1978) (citation omitted) (Question 96, Article 2).
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government can more easily appreciate. There are any number of
institutional problems connected with efforts by one legal authority
to assimilate the regulatory law of another. It would be hard for the
secular legal system to be sure that it correctly understood the
corpus of Catholic moral rules. The borrowed norms might clash
with existing New York law in ways too numerous to anticipate. The
borrowed offenses might involve elements (e.g. questions about a sinner's mental state) that the existing secular law system (adversary
procedure, rules of discovery, evidence, methods of trial and review)
was incompetent to prove. (Remember that in the Catholic Church
penitents confess their sins.) The burden of enforcing a supplementary set of norms might overload a justice system designed to do
other work. And so on.
All of the reasons I have given so far are jurisdictional (the problem of nonmembers) or prudential (the need for compromise; the
danger of pursuing perfection; the costs of assimilation). They do not
go to the merits. By that I mean that they are consistent with saying
that the Church rules would be best if we could have them. But that
is not necessarily so. Consider the rules about economic due process.
Although the Supreme Court asserts authority over constitutional
questions, it gives great leeway to other branches on matters of business regulation.5 4 One common justification is that it knows little
about business and economics, and the legislature (or the agency), so
long as it stays within wide limits, is more likely to reach the right
answer. Conservative Catholics make precisely the same point about
the Catholic bishops' efforts in the economic realm. 5 Though they
say they are in complete agreement with the bishops' ultimate aims,
they argue that we can get there faster by concentrating on production rather than (as the bishops naively do) distribution. I do not
necessarily endorse this conclusion, but the method of argument is
perfectly sensible. Moral questions arise in contexts that Church authorities will know little about, and in such cases other people might
get to the right answer first.
The Church's authority over observant Catholic public officials is,
then, qualified in a number of important ways. Let us consider what
this might mean for the question of abortion. I should rather say
54. Think about judicial review of price controls, or of public utility rates. See
FPC v. Hope Natl Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934).
55. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL:
PASTORAL LETTER ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE U.S. ECONOMY (1986).

questions, because there are many, and the answers differ. Consider
first the precise issue for which Roe v. Wade16 is taken to stand:
whether abortion is a fundamental human right protected by the
Due Process Clause. That is a fairly abstract ethical proposition, unmixed with the kinds of contingencies that lead bishops astray. It is
also obviously inconsistent with the Church's teaching that abortion
is an "unspeakable crime."' 57 If we confine our attention to the simple question whether to recognize the right, there are few prudential
reasons that would move one in sympathy with the Church's position
to do so. 58 It is difficult for me to see how Cuomo, if he accepts the
Church's teaching about abortion, could agree with the Supreme
Court's decision in Roe. But this is also an issue that he has no influence over. It can only be determined by the Supreme Court or by a
constitutional amendment.
On the other hand, accepting the Church's teaching would not, I
think, commit Cuomo to the proposition that New York should
make procuring or performing an abortion a criminal offense. This is
an issue, unlike the last, where enforcing the Church's position
would control the behavior of nonmembers. That is not inherently
improper; Cuomo routinely enforces the position of the Democratic
Party against nonmembers. But it would lead non-Catholics to vote
against him, and to undo any successes he had along this line. I am
not convinced that Cuomo is morally obliged to pursue pyrrhic
victories.
Quite apart from its effect on nonmembers, a criminal abortion
law might entail very high enforcement costs. Proponents of abortion
usually cite the example of Prohibition. The offense there is trivial
but the point is not. If we had a high rate of illegal abortions and
prosecuted violations vigorously we could put a lot of young women
and doctors in jail. If doctors complied (I assume they would) and
women continued to abort, they would run a new set of health risks.
If juries balked at convicting (and they often would), we would encourage disrespect for the law and waste enforcement resources that
we could employ elsewhere with more success (drunk drivers and
drug dealers also kill people).
This is not to say that anti-abortion laws are, absolutely speaking,
a bad idea - only that the government cannot successfully get too
far out ahead of public opinion. I hasten to add that that has not
been Cuomo's problem. I suspect that the people of New York are, if
anything, more willing than he to accept some limitation on abortion
56. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
57. Gaudium et Spes, supra note 29, § 51.
58. Now that Roe has been decided, stare decisis is a reason for leaving it in place.
See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2808-16 (1992).
I cannot think of another.
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rights.59 If that is so, the Governor could find common ground with
Church nonmembers for doing something about the problem. And a
law that had popular support would not entail the enforcement costs
I have hypothesized. In short, I see no prudential reason that Cuomo
can cite for declining to stand with at least one foot on his
principles.60
The third abortion question involved in Cuomo's case is the issue
of government funding, which he supports. On this issue it is harder
for the observant Catholic official to depart from the Church's teaching. It is not just a matter of declining for prudential reasons to enforce the moral law. Funding abortions actually promotes (what
Cuomo concedes is) evil. And taxing Church members to raise the
funds implicates them too. Cuomo argues that it is unjust to withhold funds because doing so leaves poor women worse off than rich
ones. 6 ' But if he is concerned about equalizing standards of living
this is hardly the place to start.
I want to conclude this section with a few observations about the
enforcement of Church authority. Suppose that the Governor publicly contradicts some authoritative teaching of the Church, or like
Cuomo, affirms that he will obey in his personal life but takes an
inconsistent political position. What sanctions are (from the
Church's point of view) proper?
Under canon law, one who procures an abortion is subject to automatic excommunication. 2 This means that she is unable to receive
the sacraments, to participate in certain ways at mass and other
public worship, and to hold any Church office or perform any official
ecclesiastical function.63 The excommunication becomes effective

59. I do not have figures on New York itself. However, only about 20% of Americans support abortion on demand (about the same fraction that favors a total prohibition). BURTCHAELL, supra note 44, at 273-74. Mary Ann Glendon has shown that the
American constitutional rules enforcing that regime are more permissive than those of
any other nation (Glendon studies 20 other nations) in Europe and North America.
MARY A. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW: AMERICAN FAILURES,
EUROPEAN CHALLENGES

145-57 (1987).

60. I have been assuming, in discussing this second issue, that the constitutional
regime would permit abortion regulation if the voters wanted it. Ours does not, as a
general matter, though there are some modest possibilities available after Planned
Parenthood,112 S. Ct. 2791.
61. Cuomo, supra note 1, at 25-26.
62. 1983 CODE OF CANON LAW c.1398.
63. Id. c.1331, § 1.

without any trial, though this cannot happen inadvertently. The offender must know in advance not only about the
4 gravity of the offense but also about the Church's punishment.
But that is not the offense that Catholic politicians are typically
concerned with. Cuomo, for example, has rejected abortion as a possibility in his own life. 65 His offense (if it is one) has been to support
the actions of women who want to have abortions, by a course of
official conduct (failure to promote regulation; approval of Medicaid
funding) and public statements (his speech at Notre Dame).66 I have
suggested that some, at least, of these activities are inconsistent with
the Church's teaching on abortion, which Catholics are expected to
heed. Canon 752 of the Code of Canon Law codifies the obligation
to heed Church teaching and "to avoid whatever is not in harmony
with that teaching.167 Canon 1371 deals with sanctions for violation
of these obligations:
The following are to be punished with a just penalty:
1 . . , a person who teaches a doctrine condemned by the Roman Pon-

tiff or by an ecumenical council or who pertinaciously rejects the doctrine
mentioned in can. 752 .... Go

What counts as a "just penalty" can vary. The local bishop seems to
have considerable discretion, and the Code encourages him to proceed cautiously. 9 Cardinal O'Connor suggested that excommunication was a possibility, but no American bishop has tried it. Bishop
Maher in San Diego withheld communion (a less severe sanction)
70
from Lucy Killea, a state senator who advocated abortion rights.
O'Connor's Vicar and Bishop Daily of Brooklyn have barred Cuomo
from speaking at parish churches.
These sanctions are intended to be coercive in the way that civil
64. 2 SACRAMENTUM MUNDI: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THEOLOGY 176 (Adolf
Darlap ed., 1968) [hereinafter 2 SACRAMENTUM MUNDI].
65. See supra note 2.
66. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
67. Canon 752 states:
A religious respect of intellect and will . . .is to be paid to the teaching
which the Supreme Pontiff or the college of bishops enunciate on faith or
morals when they exercise the authentic magisterium ...; therefore the Christian faithful are to take care to avoid whatever is not in harmony with that
teaching.
1983 CODE c.752.
There is some disagreement, which I am not competent to arbitrate, about the proper
interpretation of the Latin phrase "religiosum ... intellectus et voluntatis obsequium"
used in both Lumen Gentium § 25 and canon 752. The English version of Lumen Gentium translates it as "religious submission of will and of mind." The English version of
canon 752 translates it as "religious respect of intellect and will." I follow the former
usage for reasons explained in SULLIVAN, supra note 32, at 158-60.
68. 1983 CODE c.1371.
69. See id. c.1341.
70. Russell Chandler, Bishops Facing a Dilemma on Pro-Choice Politicians,L.A.
TiNEs, Nov. 22, 1989, at Al.

[VOL 30: 849, 1993]

The Pope's Submarine
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

contempt is coercive: they aim at reformation of the offender's conduct. 7 ' But they are effective only against religious believers. If I had
no interest in participating in the religious life of the Catholic community, excommunication would not concern me. (It would be like
being thrown out of the Book of the Month Club.) And once I was
willing to sever my religious ties, the Church would have no independent source of leverage. It does not, for example, have control over
its members' financial assets.
III.

RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY AND THE LIBERAL CONSTITUTION

I now want to consider two situations that a Catholic politician
like Cuomo might find himself in if he heeded religious authority in
his public life. I want to observe in each case whether our liberal
principles and our Constitution permit him to comply with the requirements of his faith. In Case One Cuomo heeds and is persuaded
by the Church's epistemic authority and wants to act accordingly. In
Case Two Cuomo is unconvinced by the Church's teaching but willing to submit to its practical authority. Case One does not present
any problems for the observant politician; Case Two does.
Suppose first, then, that Cuomo believes that abortion is evil because human life begins at conception. This conviction is consistent
with Catholic Church teaching, and Cuomo reached it in part because of the Church's persuasion and example. But it is like a proposition in geometry that Cuomo has worked out for himself: the
teacher helped him to get it, but now he can kick away the props
and get it himself. Or consider another simile:
The alcoholic in the back row at the A.A. meeting does not go home and
tell his wife that the speaker said that anyone with his drinking behavior is
a drunk. He says that his eyes were finally opened and now, with the
speaker's help, he sees what everyone else but himself had long seen but he
could not bear to see. The man says this as something he owes to a wise
and
helpful mentor, but now it is something he is vouching for himself. 2

The politician who holds this conviction in this way will not think
that Roe v. Wade73 was right in saying that abortion is a fundamental right. Nor will he favor public funding of abortion (though he
may have doubts about criminal penalties). Is there a problem with
taking these positions on questions of public policy when the belief
that underlies them had its origin in an exercise of religious
71. 2 SACRAMENTUM MUNDI, supra note 64, at 174-75.
72. BURTCHAELL, supra note 44, at 265.
73. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

authority?
No. In the first place, what else would we have Cuomo do? This is
not a case where he can centrifuge his beliefs and separate the religious element. We sometimes ask juries to do that when hearsay evidence slips in. But here religious teaching is not a piece of evidence.
It is a way of looking at the world that Cuomo has appropriated. He
can no more set it aside than he can set aside his idea of color or
shape in looking at a picture. We cannot ask him to act without
reliance on his religious convictions, because he probably has no idea
what he would do in that case. It would be like asking him how he
would decide if he were someone else.
If we were determined to avoid any religious influence on politics
we might then ask Cuomo to recuse himself from any decision involving abortion. But as Kent Greenawalt has pointed out, it is not
clear why a liberal society would want to exclude all religious influence in a case like this.74 The question about the moral worth of the
fetus is not one that anyone can answer on the basis of shared premises and publicly accessible reasons. 5 So everyone who thinks about
the question (and it is unavoidable in making abortion policy) will
have to rely on some 'private' or 'personal' grounds. 6 Only a society
actually hostile to religion 77
would want to treat it worse than other
kinds of 'personal' reasons.
Liberal principles, then, should not prevent Cuomo from acting on
his religious belief about the morality of abortion. It would be both
impossible and unfair to do so. As a matter of constitutional law, I
think the case for Cuomo is even stronger, in large part because our
Constitution does not rest entirely on liberal principles. The only
conceivable constitutional objection would be that the Establishment
Clause forbade public officials to act on beliefs that had religious
origins. But this has the rules exactly backwards. I would argue not
only that the Establishment Clause permits such action, but that the
Free Exercise Clause positively encourages it.
That assertion requires a longer defense than I can make without
changing the focus of this Article, so I will content myself with a
sketch. I begin with the assumption that freedom of religion is a
special form of protection for religious believers. From the Constitution's point of view, religious activity (ritual acts, the acquisition and
propagation of religious knowledge, observance of moral obligations)
is a good thing. The Free Exercise Clause encourages us to engage in
it. There are several limits to our enthusiasm for such activity, but
74.

(1988).

KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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they do not stem from doubts about its worth. One is that we should
not coerce people to perform ceremonies they do not believe in
(prayer, worship, declarations of belief) because it is futile, or even
counterproductive from a religious point of view, to do so. 7 8 Another
is that the best way for society to grasp religious truth is to allow
free inquiry for everyone - atheists and agnostics as well as believers.7 9 A third is that religious compulsion can cause civil strife and
leave everyone worse off.80
Official action to limit abortions (by outright restrictions, or by
withholding funds), even if it has its origin in religious conviction,
does not transgress these limits. Restrictions may be coercive, but
they do not force women to engage in religious activity or affirm a
religious belief. Nor do they affect in any way the dissenter's ability
to complain. And while they may cause contention, that alone is not
enough for an Establishment Clause violation. (Some people were
moved by religious principle to vote for the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
and it caused contention.) This is an argument that relies on the
lessons of history. And if history is to be our guide, the kind of contention we should fear results from a division along identifiably religious lines (Puritan/Baptist, Catholic/Protestant, Christian/Jew,
Muslim/Baha'i) over indisputably religious questions.
Let me turn now to Case Two, which I view as more difficult.
Suppose that Cuomo has listened attentively to the Church's teaching on abortion and has tried to come around to that point of view in
his own mind, but he just does not get it. (He thinks that the fetus
very early in pregnancy is like the very old person in a persistent
vegetative state: we are not obliged to keep either one alive at great
personal cost.) But as an observant Catholic he is aware that the
Church asks its members to conform their conduct to its teaching
(submission of will) even if they do not agree (submission of mind).
It asserts practical as well as epistemic authority.
Suppose too that Cuomo is willing to comply with the Church's

78. In Milton's phrase, to force a ritual performance is "to compell hypocrisie not
to advance religion." 7 JOHN MILTON, A Treatise of Civil Power in Ecclesiastical
Causes, in COMPLETE PROSE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 238, 256 (Yale, 1980).
79. We think of this as an argument for free speech, but Milton, to whom we most
often attribute it, was actually making a theological claim. 2 JOHN MILTON, Areopagitica, in COMPLETE PROSE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 480, 551 (Yale, 1959) ("this is the
golden rule in Theology").
80. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 464 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).

practical authority, for several reasons. One justification for the authority of the Catholic Church, as I explained in Part I, is that it
promotes unity within the Church. Orthopraxy is a way of keeping
faith with the religious community, and that might be important
enough to Cuomo for him to act against his better judgment.
Cuomo might also be willing to conform his own behavior to the
Church's teaching because of something like the service conception
of authority. He is unable in his own mind to distinguish some cases
of abortion and termination of life support. To that extent he does
not agree with the Church's teaching. But his experience and his
religious beliefs about God's guidance of his Church tell him that
the Church has a lower error rate than he does. In doing as the
Church requires he trusts, though he is by no means convinced, that
he will be doing the right thing.
Suppose further that in this case Cuomo is willing to obey Church
teaching not just in his personal life (he would not urge his wife to
have an abortion) but also in his public life (he follows the "Catholic
line" in his political positions). As I explained in Part II, the
Church's teaching authority in this area is qualified in numerous
ways. But there are some points (like abortion funding) about which
it is quite clear, and here Cuomo heeds what the Church has to say.
Is there anything illiberal or unconstitutional in obedience to authority under these circumstances?
Unlike Case One, here it is possible for Cuomo to separate his
religious from his secular convictions. Cuomo actually believes that
there is nothing wrong with abortion under some circumstances. If
you asked him he would tell you that. The reason he votes against
abortion funding and publicly opposes Roe v. Wade81 is that he feels
obligated to follow his Church's teaching. In asking Cuomo to set
aside his religious beliefs, then, we would not be asking him to do
the impossible. Would we be asking something that was unfair or
otherwise improper?
Notice a second difference between this case and the last one. In
Case One Cuomo could justify his public actions (e.g., a veto of
abortion funding) in terms of harms, benefits, and reasons that all
citizens should recognize. He would say that abortion takes innocent
life which society should protect. And he would argue that our concept of rights cannot embrace actions so intrinsically evil. It is true
that he came to believe these things by a specifically Catholic route,
but other people have reached the same conclusions by other roads
(some religious, some not), and there is nothing sectarian about saving lives.
In Case Two it is harder for Cuomo to point to a public benefit
81.
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that justifies his actions. One reason he follows the 'Catholic line' is
that orthopraxy promotes Church unity, and that is good for a variety of religious reasons. But there is no reason why non-Catholic citizens should care about the unity of Cuomo's Church. If Cuomo
vetoes abortion funding or approves abortion restrictions solely for
that reason, he puts the interest of his Church ahead of the public
interest. That is troubling, both morally and constitutionally. As a
moral matter, Cuomo is bound both by oath and by promise to represent all the citizens of New York and to uphold the Constitution.
As a constitutional matter, the case I have so far put is one where he
takes official action for the sole purpose of promoting the religious
aims of his Church. That is certainly inconsistent with the Lemon
rule against religious purposes.8 2 It is also an invitation to civil strife
along religious lines in the classical form: Cuomo's action appeals
just to Catholics, rests only on religious reasons, and imposes the
costs on nonmembers.
What makes me most uncomfortable about this case, I think, is
that it confirms the stereotype of Catholics as citizens with divided
loyalties. Cuomo's sole reason for acting is that his Church has directed him to - and by 'his Church' I mean here the bishops and
the pope. Locke said he would not extend toleration to churches
whose members "pass into the allegiance and service of another
prince.

'

His sentiments are still in fashion. Twentieth-century

Americans have been willing to "imagine the papal submarine ready
to land the First Lord of its Admiralty in Chesapeake Bay when the
White House is properly occupied." 4 Part of my effort in this Article has been to show that this dilemma will rarely arise because: (i)
Church authority is binding in varying degrees; (ii) politicians need
not always implement Church teaching; (iii) people may quite properly act on religious beliefs in cases like Case One; and of course (iv)
the Catholic Church, unlike other sovereigns, has no control over unwilling members. But the dilemma for the observant Catholic in
Case Two is real. The solution is not, as Justice Brennan once suggested, to set aside his religious beliefs. 85 It is to recuse himself, if
that is possible, or resign if it is not.
82. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971).
83. JOHN LOCKE, Epistola de Tolerantia [A LETTER ON TOLERATION] 133 (Raymond Klibansky & J. W. Gough trans. eds., 1968).
84. BURTCHAELL, supra note 44, at 260.
85. See Sanford Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil Religion: Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1047, 1062-64 (1990) (discussing
Brennan's remarks).

So far in discussing Case Two, I have supposed that Cuomo is
willing to heed the Church's practical authority only for the sake of
Church unity. But suppose he also justified obedience by reference to
the service conception of authority. He might believe that the
Church was a better judge of moral questions (as my broker is a
better judge of investments), and though he himself could not see the
wrongness of abortion he might 'take the Church's word for it.' Is
there a problem with this kind of reliance on authority?
Here too, as in my first version of Case Two, Cuomo will have no
difficulty separating his religious from his secular convictions. As far
as he can tell there is nothing wrong with abortion under some circumstances. He acts on the contrary assumption only because the
Church says otherwise and he trusts its judgment. Unlike Case One
we would not be asking Cuomo to do the impossible in setting aside
his religious beliefs.
But unlike my first version of Case Two, Cuomo here can honestly
justify his public actions on grounds that all citizens should recognize. He would argue that abortion is bad because it takes innocent
life which society should protect. It is true that he has only a tenuous
grip on that proposition. He holds it the way I hold the special theory of relativity: I really do believe that mass increases with velocity,
and that time slows down, but I have to say it does not make sense
to me. Still, he does hold it, and it is a perfectly appropriate basis for
making public policy.
Should it matter that Cuomo's belief in the immorality of abortion
derives wholly from religious premises (the Church teaches it, and
God inspires the Church's teaching)? This is a difficult question, but
I think not. It is permissible for a public official to hold an activity
immoral simply because our tradition teaches that it is. And such
beliefs can be identical in form and substance to Cuomo's belief
about abortion. In form because we apply to tradition the service
conception of authority: we think it is likely to be right even if we
cannot see the point. In substance because the tradition itself can be
plainly religious. (Consider the tradition against sodomy which the
Court upheld in Bowers v. Hardwick.86 ) The point is that most of us,
not just Catholics, see nothing wrong with relying on authority to
decide moral questions. And if that is so there is no reason to disqualify religious authorities.

86.

478 U.S. 186, 190-96 (1986).

